Neighborhood Effects of Public Housing: How the Level of Public Housing Concentration Influences Neighborhood Crime Levels by Joice, Paul
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
MPA/MPP Capstone Projects Martin School of Public Policy and Administration 
2007 
Neighborhood Effects of Public Housing: How the Level of Public 
Housing Concentration Influences Neighborhood Crime Levels 
Paul Joice 
University of Kentucky 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/mpampp_etds 
 Part of the Criminology Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration 
Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Joice, Paul, "Neighborhood Effects of Public Housing: How the Level of Public Housing Concentration 
Influences Neighborhood Crime Levels" (2007). MPA/MPP Capstone Projects. 169. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/mpampp_etds/169 
This Graduate Capstone Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Martin School of Public Policy 
and Administration at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in MPA/MPP Capstone Projects by an 
authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
1 
 
 
Neighborhood Effects of Public Housing: 
How the level of public housing concentration influences neighborhood crime levels 
 
 
Paul Joice 
Capstone in Public Policy 
Martin School of Public Policy and Administration 
University of Kentucky 
 
 
 “Assisted housing policy increasingly has been concerned with providing residential 
opportunities for low-income and special needs households outside areas of concentrated 
poverty. In recent years, this concern has dominated policymaking at the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development…” 
-George Galster, et. al. 
 
 
 
Thanks to: Tim Clay of the Louisville Police Department and Rebecca Matheny of the Louisville 
Metro Housing Authority for their help and cooperation. 
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I. Executive Summary 
 
 Public housing is plagued by the well known “not-in-my-backyard” (NIMBY) 
phenomenon. People may support the existence of public housing, but oppose it in their 
neighborhood. This is particularly relevant to “scattered site” public housing – which has 
a much lower density than “traditional” public housing – because, by its very essence, 
scattered site public housing will be “in more backyards”. Public protests against such 
programs have made it clear that people don’t care about the positive effects for the 
public housing tenants nearly as much as they care about perceived negative effects on 
their neighborhood. 
 
 My goal is to determine whether these perceived negative effects are indeed real. I 
use cross-sectional data from Louisville, Kentucky to estimate the relationship between 
both traditional and scattered site public housing, and the crime rate in the surrounding 
neighborhood. Using data obtained from the Louisville Police Department and the 
Louisville Metro Housing Authority, I find that each type is well suited to its typical use. 
Scattered site public housing, in small quantities, will not lead to an increase in 
neighborhood crime, while traditional public housing will. However, the marginal 
increase in crime is much higher for scattered site units. In fact, the addition of one 
traditional public housing unit at the margin is actually associated with a decrease in 
crime in my sample.  
  
 I conclude that there is no statistically significant relationship between scattered 
site housing and crime; therefore, opposition to small scale scattered site housing projects 
is not justified by the “there goes the neighborhood” argument. Although the following 
calculation is based on statistically insignificant results, it appears that scattered site 
housing will not increase neighborhood crime unless the unit density approaches 50 units 
per square mile – a level attained by only one census tract in Louisville. Below this level, 
scattered site housing may actually decrease crime.  
 
 However, scattered site housing is not a panacea. When public housing with a 
scattered site form and label approaches the density of traditional public housing (greater 
than 50 units per square mile), it could have a more adverse impact on the community 
than a traditional public housing project would have. Thus, when it is necessary to 
provide many new units, traditional, high density public housing may be the better 
alternative. 
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II. Public Housing: Justifications and Objectives 
 The United States government has been involved in the regulation of the housing 
industry since the turn of the 20th century, and has been directly providing housing since 
the U.S. Housing Act of 1937. Although such involvement is not justified by a market 
failure, it seems that Americans are more concerned with equity than efficiency when it 
comes to guaranteeing shelter – one of the most fundamental needs that humans have. 
The particular form of this involvement has changed drastically over the past 40 years, 
and continues to be a subject of debate today.  
 Today, the question is not whether or not the government should provide housing 
assistance, but how it should do so. Early public housing projects had the sole objective 
of supplying shelter at below market rates for those who were deemed needy. But as a 
wide range of literature – from academic studies to popular books like There are No 
Children Here – has shown, this practice led to a host of problems. While the public 
housing residents did indeed have a roof over their heads, they also had drug dealers on 
the street corners, terrible schools, and few positive role models. All this combined to 
trap public housing residents in a vicious cycle of poverty. The recognition that the form 
of public housing can have incredibly important consequences for all aspects of life for 
the recipients of the assistance led to a new objective. Public housing should not merely 
be a place to live. It should be a safe place to live, where the poorest Americans can take 
advantage of opportunities to improve their lot (and their children’s lot) in life. 
 This paper analyzes one of the methods by which this goal might be reached: 
“deconcentrating” poverty by breaking up massive, consolidated public housing projects 
into “scattered site” projects. This policy of dispersed public housing is contrasted with 
the status quo – traditional public housing. 
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III. Explanation of Concepts and Variables 
 The two general types of public housing assistance I will analyze are both rental 
programs for units owned and administered entirely by government housing authorities. 
This excludes Section 8 housing – one very common and well known method of 
dispersing public housing. There are two reasons I will not study Section 8. First of all, 
there is already an abundance of research on Section 8 housing vouchers (Olsen 2000, 
2006, 2006). Second, the location of Section 8 residents is incredibly sensitive 
information, which the Louisville Metro Housing Authority was unwilling to release to 
me.  
 The two types of public housing I am interested in are “traditional” public 
housing and “scattered site” public housing. The primary difference between the two is 
the number of units that each project includes and the density of these units (see Table 1). 
Therefore, my explanatory variable of interest is a measure of concentration, with 
traditional and scattered site housing being at opposite ends of a continuum. 
Table 1: Traditional vs. Scattered Site Public Housing 
 Description of housing projects and their operation 
“Traditional” 
Public Housing 
The government entity constructs, owns, and operates a housing 
development specifically for housing assistance recipients. Rents 
and eligibility are determined by the government by established 
procedures. These projects are typically densely populated, with 
many units in each project/complex. A popular empirical question is 
whether such a high concentration of poverty causes many social ills 
associated with public housing. 
“Scattered Site” 
Public Housing 
The government entity constructs, owns, and operates the housing 
development, just like with traditional public housing. However, the 
style of the development is different; units are spread out in an 
attempt to deconcentrate poverty, and often incorporated into mixed 
income neighborhoods.  
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 Having chosen the explanatory variable, my next task is to choose a dependent 
variable. Doing so requires some thought as to how a public housing program should be 
evaluated. The purpose of scattered-site public housing is twofold: 
1. As with any public housing, the primary purpose is to provide housing at below 
market rates to families and individuals who do not have an income considered 
sufficient to obtain decent housing in the private market. 
2. The added goal of scattered-site housing is to provide an environment in which 
public housing residents will have a better chance to lift themselves out of 
poverty.  
 A sensible way to evaluate scattered-site housing would be to see whether or not 
it does actually achieve its second goal and help its residents escape the poverty trap. 
Evaluating scattered-site public housing by the effect it has on its inhabitants is certainly 
a very important task; however, it is not my focus. The reason for this is that public 
housing is rarely judged in the public by such criteria. 
 Public housing is plagued by the well known “not-in-my-backyard” (NIMBY) 
phenomenon. People may support the existence of public housing, but oppose it in their 
neighborhood. This is particularly relevant to scattered-site public housing because, by its 
very essence, scattered-site public housing will be “in more backyards”. The theory is 
that by mixing public housing, in small doses, in with market rate housing, the effects on 
the public housing residents will be positive. However, those living in the market rate 
housing have shown strong objections. Public protests against such programs – notable 
examples being in Baltimore and Denver – have made it clear that people don’t care 
about the positive effects for the public housing tenants nearly as much as they care about 
perceived negative effects on their neighborhood (Galster and Zobel 1998). 
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 My goal is to determine whether these perceived negative effects are indeed real, 
using Louisville, KY as a case study. Therefore, my unit of analysis will be the 
neighborhoods of Louisville and my dependent variable will be one of the most important 
indicators of neighborhood quality: crime rate. But how will I determine a 
“neighborhood”? It must be in such a way as to allow the collection and analysis of data. 
The most convenient and consistent way to do this is to use census tracts. This is, 
admittedly, an imperfect measure of a neighborhood. Among Louisville’s 170 census 
tracts, the median size is 1.21 square miles, which is larger than UK’s campus (1.05 
square miles), and larger than what many people think of as a neighborhood.  
 However, this imprecision does have a benefit, in that it limits the problem of 
spillovers. Consider what would happen if my unit of analysis were census blocks – a 
much smaller subunit of census tracts. One block could be entirely composed of public 
housing, with the surrounding blocks having zero public housing. Yet those surrounding 
blocks would not exhibit the crime rates one would expect from an area with zero public 
housing; the effects of the public housing block would spill over into the surrounding 
blocks. By using a larger area of analysis like the census tract, it becomes less likely that 
a public housing project will be directly on the boundary of a neighborhood. The effects 
of the explanatory variables are contained within the unit of analysis, and spillover effects 
are diminished.  
 
IV. Literature Review 
 Before proceeding with the analysis of Louisville, it will help to consider what 
similar studies have already been done on public housing, crime, and the relationship 
between the two. Botein and Freeman (2002) conduct a review of the extant evidence of 
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the effects that public housing has on the surrounding neighborhood. They consider four 
commonly assumed consequences of public housing: decreased property values, racial 
transition (from white to minority), increased poverty concentration, and increased crime. 
They astutely point out that public housing causes these changes in two distinct ways: a 
change in the physical character of the buildings, and a change in the neighborhood’s 
residents. Thus, the physical nature of a public housing project can have an effect entirely 
independent of the effect its residents have. This idea originates from Oscar Newman’s 
theory of “defensible space” (1972); he argues that the high density construction of 
traditional public housing inhibits the development of social networks, and reduces the 
ability of a community to monitor (defend) its common space. This suggests a possible 
fixed effect due to the presence of a certain type of public housing in a neighborhood, 
plus a variable effect due to the number of public housing residents in the neighborhood. 
 McNulty and Holloway (2000) study the possibility that some of the empirically 
established association between crime and race might be mediated through proximity to 
public housing. They conduct a cross-sectional analysis of Atlanta, using 1990 census 
block groups as their unit of analysis. Their dependent variable is crime rate per 1,000 
population and their independent variable is distance from a block that includes public 
housing (blocks that contain public housing = 0). They control for: 
• residential stability (residents who have been in their home more than 5 years); 
• vacancy rate; 
• percent of the population aged 15-24 (the most likely to commit crimes); and 
• a “disadvantage index” (a combination of poverty rate, households headed by 
females, unemployment rate, and public assistance rate) 
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They confirm their theoretical expectation that as distance from public housing increases, 
crime decreases, and that including this public housing variable does mediate some of the 
effects that would otherwise be attributed to race. However, the public housing variable 
in this study does not consider the type or amount of public housing. 
 Santiago et. al. (2003) also study the effect of proximity to public housing on 
neighborhood crime, but unlike McNulty and Holloway they do consider the form of that 
public housing. They are specifically interested in the effect that the opening of 38 new 
dispersed housing units in Denver, from 1990-97, had on crime rates in the surrounding 
neighborhoods. Their sophisticated analysis includes pre- and post- controls for selection 
bias, thereby addressing the failure of previous studies to show causality. This is done by 
constructing concentric rings around each of the 38 new housing sites, estimating crime 
trends before and after the opening of the site, and using the pre- and post- crime trends 
for the rest of the city as a comparison group. They also incorporate necessary 
adjustments for spatial autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The results of this analysis 
show that the opening of a new site does not cause a significant increase (even at the 10% 
level) in the level or the trend of crime within 2000 feet of the site. In fact, they find some 
evidence that opening these sites may effect a decrease in crime.  
 However, the average number of households at each of these 38 sites is only 1.48; 
most of the sites are simply single-family homes purchased by the Denver Housing 
Authority for use by public housing residents. Their conclusion that an individual site 
does not increase crime doesn’t imply that a scattered site project (with several sites) 
would have no effect. Therefore this study has very limited applicability to larger scale 
scattered site housing programs.  
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 Of the articles referenced above, I believe that Santiago et. al. have the most 
complete, impressive model. However, such a model requires both more extensive data 
and more GIS (geographic information systems) expertise than I have. In addition, its 
limited external validity is a weakness. The model used by McNulty and Holloway fits 
my capabilities and my data very well. 
 None of the articles referred to so far have directly incorporated concentration of 
public housing into their models. Thus, further consultation of the theoretical literature is 
necessary to determine the appropriate form of my explanatory variables. The critical 
question is whether the relationship between public housing concentration and crime is 
linear, or more complex. According to Galster and Zobel (1998), answering this question 
is equivalent to answering whether or not dispersion of public housing has net social 
benefits. If there is a simple linear relationship between public housing concentration and 
crime, removing one unit of public housing in neighborhood A and placing it in 
neighborhood B will not change crime levels for society as a whole. The change in crime 
for the two neighborhoods will exactly offset. On the other hand, if there is an 
exponential relationship between public housing concentration and crime – if public 
housing has an increasing marginal effect on crime – then there would be a net benefit to 
society as a result of deconcentration. In the same paper, Galster and Zobel conduct a 
meta-analysis of the extant research and conclude that existing evidence on the nature of 
this relationship is “thin and contradictory”.  
 
V. Data Collection 
 I have been able to obtain the cooperation of both the Louisville Metro Housing 
Authority (LMHA) and the Louisville Police Department (LPD). I also use the 2000 
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Census to assemble demographic characteristics for control variables. LMHA provided 
me with a database of all 4,082 public housing units they administer (as of November 
2006), both traditional and scattered site. This does not include Section 8 housing, for 
privacy reasons. For each unit, LMHA was able to tell me its address, the census tract in 
which it is located, the project that it is a part of, and whether that project is considered 
traditional or scattered site. The 4,082 units are grouped in 27 separate projects, in a total 
of 42 census tracts. Of these, 12 projects containing 331 units are considered scattered 
site, while 15 projects containing 3,751 units are considered traditional public housing. 
The 12 scattered-site projects are contained in 33 census tracts (some projects span 
multiple tracts), and the 15 traditional projects are contained in 13 census tracts. Four 
census tracts contain both types of housing.1  
Scattered Site Housing 12 projects 33 census tracts 331 units 
Traditional Housing 15 projects 13 census tracts 3,751 units 
Total Public Housing 27 projects 42 census tracts 4,082 units 
 
 From LPD, I was able to obtain a database of all 36,963 crimes reported in 2006 
in Louisville, including the type of crime and the address where it was committed.2 
Unfortunately, LPD’s computer system does not allow them to accurately group crimes 
by census tract. Therefore, I used GIS mapping software to geocode the crimes and match 
them to a census tract. As a result of imperfections in the data, I successfully matched 
only 25,050 (out of 36,963) crimes to the census tract where they occurred (see Appendix 
A for details).  
1. Data was obtained from LMHA through Rebecca Matheny (Matheny@lmha1.org)  
2. Data was obtained from LPD crime analyst Tim Clay (Tim.Clay@louisvilleky.gov)  
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VI. Methodology and Analysis 
  My task is to establish a relationship between public housing and neighborhood 
crime rates, and to show how this relationship varies as the level of concentration of 
public housing varies. To identify this correlation, I calculate a series of increasingly 
complex regressions, culminating with a multivariate regression model with several 
controls.  
 The first two models I estimate are simple bivariate regressions of 1) crimerate 
(crimes per 1,000 people) on phdensity (public housing units per square mile), and 2) 
crimerate on PH (a dummy variable indicating the presence of public housing). Both 
models are significant, with R-squared of .056 and .152, respectively. This confirms the 
theoretical expectation that crime rate and public housing are correlated. However, it 
ignores many other important factors and should be only lightly considered. 
Model 1: crimerate = 37.4 + .049phdensity + e 
         (3.1)      (.015)    
 
Model 2: crimerate = 30.26 + 36.9PH + e 
                    (3.3)      (6.7) 
 
 Next, I regress crime rate on a set of four variables indicating the presence and 
density of both types of public housing. The purpose of this series of more targeted 
variables is two-fold. First, it will distinguish between the two types of public housing 
(scattered site and traditional), which is the goal of this research. Second, it helps me 
determine how public housing affects crime rate. As shown in previous research 
(Freeman and Botein 2000, Newman 1972), public housing influences neighborhood 
crime through two mechanisms: changing the built environment and changing the 
inhabitants. A variable indicating the presence of a certain type of public housing 
accounts for the physical change in the neighborhood, while the number and density of 
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units accounts for the change in the neighborhood’s residents. Accordingly, my third 
model uses the following four explanatory variables:  
• SS: dummy variable indicating presence of scattered site housing  
• TR: dummy variable indicating presence of traditional housing 
• SSdensity: continuous variable indicating density (units per square mile) of 
scattered site housing 
• TRdensity: continuous variable indicating density (units per square mile) of 
traditional housing  
 
Model 3: crimerate = 31.1 + 10.7SS + .864SSdensity + 39.6TR + .005TRdensity + e 
                   (3.3)     (9.8)         (.374)                (14.2)       (.019) 
 
 This third model (F=9.5; R-squared=.187) produces some interesting results. All 
four variables have positive coefficients, but only two of the four are significant at the .05 
level: TR and SSdensity.. The presence of traditional public housing has a significant (and 
large) impact on crime rate. All else equal, census tracts with a traditional public housing 
project have approximately 40 more crimes per 1,000 people than census tracts without 
such a project. However, the effect of the density of traditional public housing units is not 
significant. In other words, it does not matter whether a massive public housing project 
has 500 or 800 units; what matters it that it is massive. With scattered site housing, the 
opposite is true. The presence of a scattered site project does not have a significant 
impact on neighborhood crime, but increasing the density of such a project does. For 
example, an additional 20 scattered site units, on average, would be associated with an 
increase of about 17 crimes per 1,000 people. 
 Even the third model, with its more complex explanatory variables, does not paint 
a complete picture. To do that, control variables must be included. Otherwise, I cannot be 
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confident that my explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the error term, and my 
estimates may be biased. Based upon my review of the literature, I incorporate the 
following neighborhood characteristics as control variables in the fourth and final model: 
• Poverty: percent of the population of the census tract living below the poverty 
line. High levels of poverty are expected to increase crime because poverty limits 
opportunities and may necessitate criminal behavior. Crime can also limit 
opportunities and increase neighborhood poverty. 
• Black: percent of population of the census tract that is black. Race may be a proxy 
for otherwise unmeasurable characteristics of a person or community that affect 
propensity to commit crime. 
• Youngmale: percent of population of the census tract that is male, aged 15-24. 
This is the demographic group most likely to commit crime. Large numbers of 
young males should be expected to increase crime. 
• Owned: percent of housing units in the census tract that are owner occupied. This 
is an indicator of residential stability. High levels of home ownership indicate a 
stable community and should decrease crime. 
• Vacant: percent of housing units in the census tract that are vacant. Vacant 
buildings can increase crime by serving as hideouts for criminals, and are also an 
indicator of economic distress. High vacancy rates should correlate with high 
crime. 
 These five control variables are included because they can reasonably be expected 
to influence neighborhood crime. Of course, it may be argued that there are many more 
variables that merit inclusion. I have settled on these five based on their prevalence in the 
existing literature, and in order to maintain a parsimonious model.   
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Model 4: crimerate = 7.8 -13.15SS + .274SSdensity + 33.83 TR -.047TRdensity  
  (17.7)   (8.5)          (.306)                (11.3)          (.021)  
 
-.26black -.22owned +3.53vacant +1.34poverty + 1.48youngmale + e 
  (.125)      (.177)          (.911)          (.395)                (1.07) 
 
 Model 4 is statistically significant, with an F statistic of 18.14, and an adjusted R-
squared of .477. The coefficients of the four public housing variables in model 4 show 
results similar to those of model 3. Again, there is a significant and large increase in 
crimes per 1,000 people accompanying the presence of a traditional public housing 
project. However, as the density of these units increases, crime rate actually decreases 
very slightly. With scattered site housing, the presence of a project seems to be associated 
with a fairly large decrease in crime rate, while increased density leads to increased 
crime. However, neither scattered site variable coefficient is statistically significant. 
 Among the control variables of model 4, there are few surprises. The negative 
coefficient on black lends support to the conclusions of McNulty and Holloway (2000); 
while areas with a high proportion of black residents often exhibit higher crime, this 
effect is apparently mediated through the inclusion of public housing and other control 
variables. Another notable product of model 4 is the substantial impact of vacancy rate. 
Whether vacant buildings actually provide a haven for crime or are merely a proxy for 
general neighborhood blight, they do show a significant and fairly large effect on crime 
rate. A 1% increase in the vacancy rate is associated with an increase of 3.53 crimes per 
1,000 people. 
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VII. Limitations of Analysis 
 This analysis is subject to some fairly significant limitations. Most important 
among these is the problem of endogeneity. I am unable to say whether public housing 
causes crime. It is likely that public housing is placed in areas that have high crime to 
begin with, because of the lower property values in these areas. One way to correct this is 
with the inclusion of an instrumental variable (IV). The IV would have to be highly 
correlated with public housing, uncorrelated with the error term of the model, and not 
directly causing crime. Some potential IVs for public housing concentration include: 
• overall housing concentration  
• disabled/elderly public housing (which is not included in my data set) 
• alternative public housing sites (sites that were considered but not ultimately 
chosen) 
Of these, the only one readily available to me – overall housing concentration – is also 
probably the weakest. 
 The ideal way to eliminate endogeniety in this case would be with better data, 
extended over time. Because of the recent consolidation of the Jefferson County and 
Louisville governments, LPD does not have reliable historical data beyond 2004, and as a 
result, I was limited to a cross-sectional analysis. But if multiple years of data were 
available, encompassing a period of substantial change in the location of public housing 
projects, a longitudinal analysis would be far superior. 
 Another significant problem is the poor distribution of the data. Of the 170 census 
tracts in Louisville, only 42 have any public housing at all (containing a total of 4,082 
units). Of those 42 census tracts with public housing, only 9 have more than 50 units; 
these 9 census tracts account for 91.6% of the city’s public housing. There may also be 
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some question of the validity of the crime statistics. A glance at a scatterplot shows that 
one particular census tract was the home of 1001 crimes (4.2% of the total), which is over 
7 times the average for Louisville. With both crimes and public housing being heavily 
skewed, estimating a relationship between the two may be like trying to hit a raindrop 
with a pebble. Furthermore, difficulties in the geocoding process (detailed in Appendix 
A) suggest a possibility that the crimes I was able to successfully geocode may not be 
representative of the entire set of crimes committed. Similarly, as with all crime research, 
if some crimes go systematically unreported, then my crime statistics will not be 
representative of the true level of crime taking place.  
 The final issue with the crime data is that I chose to include all types of crimes in 
my analysis; not just violent crime. I felt using only violent crime would be an 
unnecessary complication; while public housing in general might be more associated with 
violent crime, the inclusion of all crimes should not inject bias into the comparison of two 
types of public housing. Therefore, this is not a problem, per se, but must be noted when 
interpreting my results. 
 
VIII. Conclusions 
 My most comprehensive model (model 4) suggests that in Louisville, the presence 
of traditional public housing causes a significant increase in crime, but that adding 
additional units to a project does not increase crime further. Meanwhile, the presence of 
scattered site housing may actually decrease crime, but this could be offset as more units 
are added. 
 The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this is that both types of public housing 
are good at what they’re meant for. Consider the challenge of placing 400 new units in a 
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one square mile census tract that currently has no public housing. Using model 4, and 
assuming causality, 400 new scattered site units would lead to an increase of 96.45 
crimes per 1,000 people in the census tract. If those 400 units were built in a traditional 
project, there would be an increase of only 15.03 crimes per 1,000. Obviously, this 
example is somewhat absurd; a 400 unit scattered site project would be so dense it could 
not be considered “scattered”. In the 33 census tracts that do contain scattered site 
housing, the average number of units is 10. If the above example were calculated for 10 
units instead of 400, the scattered site project would have an impact of -10.41 crimes per 
1,000; a decrease! 
 What is the level at which scattered site housing becomes too dense? This can be 
answered by examining the total effect of scattered site housing on crime. In Model 4, 
this is accounted for by: -13.15SS + .274SSdensity. When these two terms are equal, 
scattered site housing has zero effect. Solving for SSdensity suggests that when the 
density of scattered site units in a census tract exceeds 48 units per square mile, there will 
be a net increase in crime for that census tract (this assumes SS = 1). As a result, it seems 
reasonable to recommend that scattered site projects be limited to a density of less than 
48 units per square mile. Currently, Louisville has only one census tract with a scattered 
site housing density above this threshold.  
 Furthermore, it should be noted that scattered site housing can have a beneficial 
impact on the vacancy rate, which I have shown to be another significant determinant of 
neighborhood crime. A well designed scattered site housing project could rehabilitate 
vacant, run down homes, further decreasing crime. 
 Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn is that more research on this 
issue is needed. Continuing to collect data for future years and developing a data set 
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suitable for a panel study could allow for a much more powerful analysis that would 
address many of the problems I have encountered, especially the inability to infer 
causality. While my data suggests that a well-operated scattered site housing project will 
not lead to increased crime, stronger causal evidence may be needed to assuage the fears 
of “NIMBY” homeowners who expect a crime wave to take over their neighborhood.
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Appendix A: Data Collection, Problems and Solutions 
 The primary problem I had in assembling a data set was standardizing all my 
different data sources. In order to be able to describe a neighborhood by a set of 
variables, each data source had to have a consistent definition of “neighborhood”. I 
realized exactly how difficult this would be when I discovered that even the most widely 
used geographic units – census tracts – were not identical between LPD, LMHA, and the 
true authority: the census. The cause of this appears to be that LHMA and LPD are using 
outdated census tract boundaries in their systems. As a result, I was forced to verify a 
significant percentage of the LMHA addresses through the Census database. I am 
extremely confident in my revised tabulations.  
 Solving the problem with the LPD data was more difficult because the extreme 
number of records (36,963) prevented me from verifying them one by one. Therefore, I 
used GIS mapping software to geocode the crimes, matching them against a “road layer” 
from the Census TIGER database. Then I matched this “road layer” to a “census layer”. 
This process can be seen in Figures 1-3 below. Due to incomplete addresses in the LPD 
crime database, many crimes could not be mapped out accurately. Additionally, some of 
the crimes that were mapped (at 2006 addresses) could not be matched to the Census tract 
database (from 2000). As a result, of the 36,963 crimes committed, I was able to 
successfully match 25,050 of them to the census tract where they occurred. As long as the 
11,913 missing observations are randomly distributed, this is not a problem. The one 
significant concern I have is that the addresses that could not be matched to the year 2000 
census might be recent suburban developments. If this is the case, crime in these 
suburban census tracts would be underrepresented in my data set. 
 To view these data sets, feel free to contact me at PJoice@gmail.com.  
22 
Figure 1: Louisville Census Tracts (light blue) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Louisville Census Tracts (light blue), with Roads (dark blue) 
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Figure 3: Census Tracts (light blue), Roads (dark blue), and Geocoded Crimes (red) 
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Appendix B: Summary of Crime Statistics, Tallied by Quarter and Type of Offense 
First Quarter 2006 
Assault 917
Burglary/Theft 6928
Murder 18
Rape 71
Other 261
Total 8195
 
Second Quarter 2006 
Assault 1075
Burglary/Theft 8168
Murder 25
Rape 77
Other 250
Total 9595
 
Third Quarter 2006 
Assault 1070
Burglary/Theft 8331
Murder 9
Rape 58
Other 230
Total 9698
 
Fourth Quarter 2006 
Assault 988
Burglary/Theft 8190
Murder 17
Rape 53
Other 227
Total 9475
25 
Appendix C: Data Analysis and Statistical Output 
 Tabulated results of Model 3: 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. t-value P-value 
SS 10.678 9.800 1.09 0.277 
TR 39.591 14.172 2.79 0.006 
SSdensity 0.864 0.374 2.31 0.022 
TRdensity 0.005 0.019 0.28 0.784 
Constant 31.098 3.264 9.53 0 
 
STATA summary of Model 3: 
. reg crimerate SS TR ssdensity trdensity 
 
     Source |       SS           df        MS               Number of obs =     170 
-------------+------------------------------                    F(  4,   165)      =    9.50 
      Model |  52823.3918     4   13205.848        Prob > F           =  0.0000 
  Residual |  229295.099   165  1389.66727    R-squared        =  0.1872 
-------------+------------------------------            Adj R-squared  =  0.1675 
        Total |  282118.491   169  1669.34018         Root MSE       =  37.278 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
crimerate |      Coef.    Std. Err.      t        P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          SS |   10.67843   9.799638     1.09   0.277    -8.670424    30.02728 
          TR |   39.59098   14.17226     2.79   0.006     11.60862    67.57333 
ssdensity |   .8635914   .3744854     2.31   0.022     .1241902    1.602993 
 trdensity |   .0052225   .0189814     0.28   0.784    -.0322553    .0427003 
     _cons |    31.0981   3.263759      9.53   0.000     24.65398    37.54221 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Tabulated results of Model 4: 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. t-value P>t 
     
SS -13.152 8.504 -1.55 0.124 
TR 33.833 11.310 2.99 0.003 
ssdensity 0.274 0.306 0.9 0.372 
trdensity -0.047 0.021 -2.26 0.025 
black -0.264 0.125 -2.11 0.037 
owned -0.223 0.177 -1.26 0.208 
vacant 3.528 0.911 3.87 0 
poverty 1.343 0.395 3.4 0.001 
youngmale 1.477 1.069 1.38 0.169 
constant 7.833 17.670 0.44 0.658 
 
 STATA summary of Model 4: 
. reg crimerate SS TR ssdensity trdensity black owned vacant poverty youngmale 
 
    Source |       SS             df       MS                Number of obs =     170 
-------------+------------------------------             F(  9,   160)     =   18.14 
     Model |  142487.738     9  15831.9709                 Prob > F          =  0.0000 
 Residual |  139630.753   160  872.692208         R-squared       =  0.5051 
-------------+------------------------------             Adj R-squared =  0.4772 
       Total |  282118.491   169  1669.34018           Root MSE       =  29.541 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  crimerate |      Coef.      Std. Err.        t        P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            SS |   -13.1519    8.503781   -1.55   0.124    -29.94603     3.642227 
            TR |   33.83302   11.31017    2.99   0.003     11.49655      56.16949 
 ssdensity |   .2743096   .3064885     0.90   0.372    -.3309751     .8795942 
   trdensity |  -.0467985   .0206925    -2.26   0.025    -.0876641   -.0059329 
        black |  -.2641915   .1253975    -2.11   0.037    -.5118391   -.0165438 
      owned |  -.2234706   .1767672    -1.26   0.208    -.5725685    .1256273 
      vacant |   3.527806   .9110682     3.87   0.000     1.728536     5.327076 
     poverty |   1.343428   .3952026     3.40   0.001     .5629418     2.123914 
youngmale |   1.477375   1.068977    1.38   0.169    -.6337495      3.5885 
       _cons |   7.833089   17.67019     0.44   0.658    -27.06379    42.72997 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
